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认知的具身化(Embodiment)(1)-科技哲学
来源:  作者:李恒威 盛晓明  点击:次  时间:2002-01-27 00:00于哲学网发表

 参考文献:

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[2] 莱考夫在和布鲁克曼(John Brockman)的谈话("Philosophy In The Flesh":A Talk With George Lakoff)中再直白不过地认为:我们是神经存在,我们的大脑从我们身体其余部份接受它们的输入。我们的身体像什么以及它们如何在世界中发挥作用塑造了我们用以思考的恰当的概念。我们根本无法思考任何东西——除了我们的具身大脑(embodied brains)允许的那些东西。

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Embodiment of Cognition






Abstract : The notion of embodiment in Cognitive Science is being reinforced due to the limitation and trouble of computational metaphor in cognition since the 80s of last century. Embodiment, situatedness and enaction have merged into each other comprehensively in cognitive science. The embodied cognition holds that cognition is not a transcendental logical competence, but a continuous evolutionary process of situatedness; That the body is at the core of cognition originates from the fact that bodily actions itself reveals the existential intentionality to impulse cognitive development. The internalization theory by Piajet & Vygotsky, the metaphorical mapping theory by Lakoff & Johnson have shed light on how the bodily actions is proceeding toward cognition in higher level. At present, benefitting from the Dynamic System Theory, the research of neural modeling of embodied cognition is developing vigorously. Thus, a more stereographic view of cognition has come into being.

Key words : cognition, situatedness/embeddedness, enactive, embodiment, dynamics.


 



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